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THE MEDIA AS PARTICIPANTS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS
MONICA HAKIMI *
INTRODUCTION
For most of the foreign policy audience, the really effective political
map of the world—that is to say, their operational map of the
world—is drawn by the reporter and the editor, not by the cartographer.
Bernard Cohen1

We know what we know about current international events
through the media. The media (with their instantaneous transmission
of images and sound across great distances) inform us of everything
from the train bombings in Madrid and London, to human rights
abuses in Darfur, to the fall of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Yet the media
do not simply communicate raw information; they sele ctively filter,
define and give shape to the events that they cover—in terms of what
is happening, whether it is appropriate, and how relevant international actors should and do respond. The media thus are the nerves
of the international system, and, as mass communicators, they perform critical functions in the international legal process.2

Copyright © 2006 by Monica Hakimi
* Attorney-Adviser, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State. J.D., Yale.
The author acknowledges with gratitude the comments of Michael Reisman and Jacob Cogan.
The views expressed in this Article are the author's own and not necessarily those of the Department of State or the U.S. Government.
1. BERNARD COHEN, THE PRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY 13 (1963).
2. This Article adopts the lens of the New Haven School of international legal jurisprudence. The New Haven School understands international law, not as a set body of rules, but in
terms of processes of decision that are consistent with expectations of what is "right," and that
are effected through various controls. For a thorough discussion on the New Haven School, see,
for example, W. Michael Reisman, The View from the New Haven School of International Law,
86 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 118 (1992) [hereinafter View from New Haven]; W. Michael Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, 75 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 101
(1981) [hereinafter International Lawmaking ].
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The media’s effects on societies and individuals have been studied from a gamut of academic and political angles.3 In international
legal scholarship, however, the media tend to be discussed briefly4 or
in certain limited contexts, such as the use of the media to disseminate propaganda5 or the regulation and control of the media.6 There
has not been any comprehensive study on the media’s functions in the
international legal process. The lack of scholarship in this regard is
likely attributable, at least in part, to the facts that the media are unconventional participants, and that they oftentimes operate “behind
the scenes”—as messengers for other actors and at deep levels of the
public subconscious. If anything, however, these characteristics increase, rather than decrease, the media’s influence. This Article examines that influence.
In Part I of this Article, I put in context the question of the media’s influence in the international legal process. That process is
3. For an analysis of the ways in which the media democratize society and increase cultural plurality, see, for example, STANLEY J. BARAN & DENNIS K. DAVIS, MASS
COMMUNICATION THEORY: FOUNDATIONS , FERMENT, AND FUTURE 7, 99 (2000) (describing
the media as an independent social institution that keeps the government in check). For an alternative analysis, arguing that the media contribute to the demise of social tranquility and of
the public sphere, see, for example, id. at 20-55; TIM O'SULLIVAN, ET. AL., K EY CONCEPTS IN
COMMUNICATION AND CULTURAL STUDIES 173-74 (1994) (describing the mass society theory,
which contends that the media have a destructive influence on atomized and easily manipulated
individuals); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC
SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (Thomas Burger trans.,
1989) (blaming the media for the demise of the public sphere). For an argument that the media
only moderately affect social organization, and that their ultimate messages depend on psychological and environmental factors among the audience for meaning, see, for example, Jennings
Bryant & Richard L. Street, From Reactivity to Activity and Action: An Evolving Concept and
Weltanschauung in Mass and Interpersonal Communication, in ADVANCING COMMUNICATION
SCIENCE: MERGING MASS AND INTERPERSONAL PROCESSES 162 (Robert P. Hawkins, et al.
eds., 1988).
4. See, e.g., Achilles Skordas, Hegemonic Custom? , in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND
THE F OUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 317, 323-24 (Michael Byers & Georg Nolte ed.,
2003) (noting that the media contribute to the "public conscious" and play a role in policyma king); Onuma Yasuaki, International Law in and with International Politics: The Functions of International Law in International Society , 14 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 105, 125 (2003) (noting that when
governments sign and ratify a treaty, they generally work "to persuade domestic and international media institutions" of the treaty's value).
5. See, e.g., B.S. MURTY, PROPAGANDA AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL
R EGULATION OF THE IDEOLOGICAL INSTRUMENT OF COERCION (1968); Llezlie L. Green,
Gender Hate Propaganda and Sexual Violence in the Rwandan Genocide: An Argument for Intersectionality in International Law, 33 COLUM. HUM. R TS. L. R EV. 733 (2002).
6. See, e.g., Lewis E. Schnurr, Media and Telecommunications Regulation and the Internet:
Regulate or Strangulate?, MEDIA L. & POL'Y Spring 2000, at 11, 17-18 (2000); Alison Harcourt,
The European Commission and Regulation of the Media Industry, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 425 (1998).

01_HAKIMI.DOC

2006]

3/1/2006 12:49 PM

THE MEDIA AS PARTICI PANTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS

3

characterized by significant communicative gaps that the media help
fill. In Part II, I analyze the media’s functions at every stage of the international legal process—from the prescription of international law,
to its codification, invocation, application and even termination. In
Part III, I address systemic factors that impede media performance,
demonstrating that, although the media perform important legal functions, they do not perform those functions perfectly. In Part IV, I
consider efforts to minimize these imperfections. I conclude that the
media will continue to operate imperfectly but as unique and specialized partic ipants in the international legal process. The goal, then, is
to recognize both the media’s functions and their limits so that we, as
international scholars and practitioners, can work within that process
to achieve desirable legal and policy outcomes.
I. THE MEDIA IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS
All legal processes are processes of communication.7 In municipal legal systems, the relevant communications generally occur
through institutionalized mechanisms, such that a State’s legislature
communicates the content of a law through the language of the legislation, and sometimes also through accompanying legislative history,
and the courts may then communicate interpretations, refinements
and modifications of the law in the orders and decisions that they issue.8 To the extent that a court communicates an understanding of
the law with which the legislature disagrees, the legislature may communicate that fact through subsequent legislation.9 In this way, the
legislature and the courts continually communicate with each other
and with the relevant community concerning the law’s substantive
content.
These institutionalized mechanisms of communication are not
well de veloped in the international system. Although the interna-

7. See Reisman, International Lawmaking, supra note 2, at 105-08. "Put in simplest terms,
lawmaking or the prescribing of policy as authoritative for a community is a process of communication." See also id. at 105.
8. See, e.g., Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. R EV. 16, 133-34 (2002) (describing the dialogue between the judiciary and
the legislature); William N. Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 Y ALE L. J. 331 (1991).
9. See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Trademark: Champion of Free Speech, 27 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 187, 197-98 (2004) (referencing the legislature's corrective response to judicial communications); William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. R EV. 321, 371 (1990) (also referencing the legislature's corrective response to
judicial communications).
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tional legal system may in some instances communicate a law’s policy
content through “legislation,” and although that legislation may from
time to time be interpreted or applied by international courts or tribunals, the legislative and judicial mechanisms of communication are
not as comprehensive in the international system as they are in municipal systems.10 Much international law is not legislated, but rather
established in the form of custom over time, and modifications or refinements of the law come, not from the judiciary, but from a variety
of unorganized components, including but not limited to States, international organizations, major corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and large terrorist groups.11 Despite this informal and
disorganized nature of the international legal process, communication
is nevertheless essential for the international norms to have the force
of law, in terms of their meaning for and intended effect on the relevant community. In the absence of institutionalized channels, international legal communications often occur through the open lines of
the media. The media, in other words, fill the communicative gaps in
the international legal process.
In filling these gaps, the media are unique from more conventional international actors—and, by conventional actors, I primarily
mean States, international organizations, and even nongovernmental
organizations12 —in that the media do not have a defined institutional
role in the international legal process. Indeed, their role is so amorphous that the media are not seen as participants at all. The media do
not “have a seat at the table” at international legal conferences, they
do not participate in international organiz ations or nongovernmental
organizations, and they generally are not considered proper subjects
of international law.13 Rather, the media participate in the international process by operating in the background and at deep levels of

10. See Reisman, International Lawmaking , supra note 2, at 103.
11. See Reisman, View from New Haven, supra note 2, at 123.
12. As for the increasing "conventionality" of NGOs, see, for example, Jost Delbrück,
Transnational Federalism: Problems and Prospects of Allocating Public Authority Beyond the
State, 11 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 31, 43-44 (2004) (noting some of the roles that NGOs
play in the international legal process and describing them as "limited deriv ative legal subjects
under secondary rules of international law"); Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Judicial Proceedings, 88 AM. J. INT'L. L. 611 (1994) (describing the increasingly important role that NGOs play in international judicial proceedings).
13. For a discussion of the proper subjects of international law, see generally, IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 66 (1998); MALCOLM N. SHAW,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 137-39 (1997).
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the public subconscious. As I discuss below, this makes them quite
powerful, and also potentially quite dangerous.
II. THE MEDIA’S POSITIVE FUNCTIONS
Because communication is essential throughout the international
legal process, the media, as communicative gap-fillers, participate at
every stage of that process. To varying degrees, they participate in
the prescription, codification, invocation, application, and termination
of international law. In this Part, I consider the media’s functions
during each of these stages of the international legal process.
Yet before examining, as a general matter, the media’s functions
in the international legal process, I consider for background a concrete case in which media participation was critical: the case of the
Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse “scandal” in Iraq. This media “scandal”
erupted in April 2004, when photographs depicting prisoner mistreatment were aired on CBS’ 60 Minutes II.14 Yet “news” of that
mistreatment existed long before the CBS broadcast. Between March
and November 2003, the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) claimed to have documented or observed numerous instances
of mistreatment at Abu Ghraib—including the hooding and beating
of detainees and acts of humiliation that would later incite such a
strong public response.15 According to the ICRC, it regularly brought
these instances of mistreatment to the attention of coalition forces,
both orally and in writing, throughout 2003.16 Moreover, during the
end of 2003, the U.S. military itself began investigating the matter.
The investigation by the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command
“uncovered numerous photos and videos portraying in graphic detail
detainee abuse by Military Police personnel . . . .”17 A different U.S.
14. 60 Minutes II: Abuse of Iraqi POWs by GIs Probed (CBS television broadcast, Apr. 28,
2004), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/04/27/60II/main614063.shtml (last visited July 15, 2005).
15. Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on the Treatment by the
Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and Other Protected Persons by the Geneva Conventions in
Iraq During Arrest, Internment and Interrogation (February 2004) [hereinafter ICRC Report], in
THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE R OAD TO ABU GHRAIB 383, 390-93 (Karen J. Greenberg &
Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005); see also Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Found Abuses at Abu Ghraib
Last Year, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2004, at A13; CBS News, Abuses at Abu Ghraib: Timeline,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/04/27/60II/main614063.shtml (follow "Interactive: Abuse
at Abu Ghraib" hyperlink; then follow "Timeline" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 7, 2005).
16. See ICRC Report, supra note 15, at 385.
17. The Taguba Report: Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade
(March 2004), in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE R OAD TO ABU GHRAIB 405, 415 (Karen J.
Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005).
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military investigation, commenced in mid-January 2004,18 culminated
in a March 2004 report by a Major General Antonio M. Taguba, who
found ample evidence—in the form of written confessions, detainee
statements and witness statements—of detainee mistreatment.19
The findings of the ICRC and of the U.S. military investigations
had been kept confidential, but relatively modest reports of mistreatment trickled into the public domain as early as the spring or
summer of 2003.20 Further, in mid-January 2004, when the Pentagon
initiated the investigation that would result in the Taguba Report, it
announced publicly that it had begun an inquiry into the matter.21
Nevertheless, until the 60 Minutes broadcast in April 2004, any discussion of detainee mistreatment in the press tended to be only cursory and relegated to back pages in the print media.22 The public, for
the most part, seemed unaware of the issue.
This all changed when 60 Minutes devoted an entire segment to
Abu Ghraib, airing photographs that made real the acts perpetrated
by individuals in the U.S. military police. The broadcast aroused public attention and suddenly sparked a media “scandal,” with photographs of the mistreatment appearing on the front pages of newspapers and on major television news programs around the world.23 The

18. Id. at 407.
19. Id. at 416 (documenting that U.S. military police had arranged detainees in sexually
explicit positions for photographing, had arranged them naked in a pile and then jumped on
them, had placed dog chains around their necks while they were naked, had had sex with at least
one detainee, and had used military dogs to intimidate detainees).
20. See Peter Slevin, System Failures Cited for Delayed Action on Abuses, WASH. POST,
May 20, 2004, at A19 ("On May 15, [2003,] five weeks after major combat operations ended,
Amnesty International publicized what it considered cases of ill treatment and raised its evidence with U.S. military pe rsonnel."). Cf. Douglas Jehl & Eric Schmitt, In Abuse, a Portrayal of
Ill-Prepared, Overwhelmed G.I.'s, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2004, at A1 (describing a May 2003 incident of abuse that later became the subject of testimony presented in a court-martial).
21. See Who Knew of Abuses and When, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2004, at A12 ("Pentagon officials said the photographs [depicting the abuses] were described in general terms to [Secretary
of Defense] Rumsfeld in mid-January."); Eric Schmitt, Inquiry Ordered Into Reports of Prisoner
Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2004, at A7.
22. See, e.g., Sewell Chan, U.S. Soldiers Charged in Abuse of Iraqis, WASH. POST, Mar. 21,
2004, at A21 (974 word story on page A21); Schmitt, supra note 20 (367 word story on page A7);
Eight Marine Reservists Face Charges in POWs' Treatment; Two Charged with Negligent Homicide in Death of Iraqi, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2003, at A23 (475 word story on page A23).
23. See, e.g., Jim VandeHei, Kerry Assails Bush on Iraq; Senator Says War Is 'Mismanaged,' WASH. POST, May 13, 2004, at A01 (referring to "pictures of the abused prisoners [that]
were plastered on television screens worldwide"); David Carr, News Media Quandary over
Showing Graphic Images of Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2004, at A14 (discussing the publication and broadcast of the images in newspapers and on television); Sarah Lyall, Europeans Like
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public response in the United States and abroad became intense, and
the Bush Administration suddenly found itself responding publicly
and quite extensively to an issue that it had managed quietly for
months. Within days of the 60 Minutes broadcast, Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld testified before Congress, apologized publicly for
the abuses,24 and flew to the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq to condemn
the mistreatment of detainees and to pledge that the United States
would appropriately punish any wrongdoers.25 President Bush also
condemned the abuses, appearing on two Arabic language television
networks to label them “abhorrent” deviations from U.S. morals.26
The media played a critical role in disseminating intelligence
about Abu Ghraib, in invoking and applying the relevant international legal norms, and in communicating the responses of the relevant international actors. For its part, the U.S. Government response, at least as reflected in public statements, was to uphold the
violated international norms and to commit to taking appropriate enforcement actions.27 The Abu Ghraib prison case thus exemplifies the
media’s participation during various stages of the international legal
process. With this example in mind, I turn to a more general and systematic analysis of the media’s functions at each such stage.
A. Prescription
Prescription or lawmaking occurs when a series of communications create in a target audience a set of expectations about policy
content, authority and control.28 Prescription may be accomplished

Bush Even Less than Before, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2004, at Sec. 1.4 (referring to "pictures showing the humiliation of Iraqi prisoners [that] were published all over the world").
24. Thom Shanker & Eric Schmitt, Rumsfeld Accepts Blame and Offers Apology in Abuse,
N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2004, at A1.
25. Thom Shanker, At Iraqi Prison, Rumsfeld Vows to Punish Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, May 14,
2004, at A1.
26. Christine Hauser, Many Iraqis are Skeptical of Bush TV Appeal, N.Y. TIMES, May 6,
2004, at A16.
27. President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld each underscored that the abuses were devia tions from the norm and inconsistent with American values. See id.; Shanker & Schmitt, supra
note 24. Each also promised that the wrongdoers would be brought to justice. See id.; White
House
Press
Release
(May
5,
2004),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/05/20040506-1.html.
In addition, Secretary
Rumsfeld stated that he was seeking compensation for prisoners whose abuse included certain
sexual acts. See Shanker & Schmitt, supra note 24.
28. Reisman, International Lawmaking , supra note 2; Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael
Reisman, The Prescribing Function in World Constitutive Process: How International Law is
Made, 6 YALE STUD. IN WORLD PUB. ORD. 249, 250 (1980).
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by a legislature or by some other organized body, but in international
law it is largely accomplished through informal communications, such
as public statements and actions, that result in the establishment of
custom.29 These informal communications are often transmitted
through, or otherwise covered by, the media. As such, the media help
establish the substantive policy that ultimately becomes law.
But helping to establish the substantive policy is only one way in
which the media participate in the lawmaking process. The media
also participate in that process by helping to define its parameters;
they identify decision-makers, disperse intelligence, and allocate
communal values.30 These process-oriented functions are inextricably
linked to the function of substantive lawmaking, because the substance of a law will vary according to the person who makes it, the information before him or her, and the policies and values that he or
she perceives to be at stake. In this Section, I discuss the media’s role
with respect to each of these lawmaking functions.
1. Identifying Decision-Makers. In order for substantive policy
to have the effect of “law,” the actors that prescribe it must, in the
minds of the prescription audience, have appropriate levels of authority and control.31 A mobster is simply a criminal, and not a lawmaker,
because although he makes enforceable policy decisions, the public
does not perceive him to be a legitimate lawmaker. In other words,
the mobster is not viewed by the relevant audience as having the authority to make law. This public perception is based on a complex interplay of societal and institutional factors, including the facts that the
mobster is not in an official position of authority, and that he acts extra-legally. But these specific factors are not necessarily sufficient to
deny the mobster legitimacy. The freedom fighter also lacks an official position of authority and acts extra-legally, but, unlike the mobster, the freedom fighter’s supporters view him as a legitimate participant in the legal process. The freedom fighter occupies a position of
authority that the mobster does not because (of the two of them) the
relevant audiences perceive only the freedom fighter as being a le-

29. See Reisman, View from New Haven, supra note 2, at 123.
30. Professors McDougal and Reisman identified these functions as inherent in the prescriptive process. See Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, International Law in PolicyOriented Perspective, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY DOCTRINE AND THEORY 103, 107 (R. St. J. MacDonald & Douglas M.
Johnston eds., 1983)
31. See Reisman, International Lawmaking , supra note 2.
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gitimate decision-maker. The audience’s perceptions thus help determine whether an actor will have the legitimacy to participate in the
lawmaking process.32 The media influence these perceptions, and
thus help identify decision-makers, in the manner and the substance
of their coverage.
Especially in their coverage of public international events, the
media tend to identify as decision-makers those who already occupy
positions of authority and who, therefore, already participate in the
international legal process.33 These decision-makers include presidents or prime ministers of powerful States and heads of prominent
international organizations, such as the United Nations or the European Community. They also include certain less conventional actors,
such as multinational corporations and major terrorist groups. In
these cases, media coverage usually does not introduce the prescriptive audience to the decision-makers, but does reaffirm the roles that
these actors play in the lawmaking process. Media attention to highlevel State officials, for example, both reflects and reinforces the positions of authority that the prescriptive audience endows upon those
officials.
In addition to identifying as decision-makers actors that partic ipate frequently in the international process, the media sometimes introduce the audience to new or more specialized decision-makers.
With respect to these decision-makers, the media tend to focus on
those who, because of context or circumstance, are uniquely situated
to make or influence public order decisions. This is often the case
with “talking heads” who have relevant expertise or experience, and
who may be featured in the media to explain a particular inc ident or
policy proposal. It is also the case for specia lized interest groups,
such as human rights organizations that use the media to publicize
their work; media attention highlights the organization’s activ ities and
may make it politically inexpedient for conventional actors to ignore
or impede those activities.34
32. See id. at 110 (noting that the audience endows the prescriber with the authority that
renders his or her communication a lawmaking activity).
33. See TED GALEN CARPENTER, THE CAPTIVE PRESS: FOREIGN POLICY CRISIS AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 5 (1995) (noting characteristics of the symbiotic relationship between government officials and members of the news media).
34. For instance, the Human Rights Watch (HRW) website lists the incidents for which
HRW reports have led to a response by conventional international actors. See, e.g., Papua New
Guinea: Police Respond to HRW Brutality Charge, http://www.hrw.org/update/2005/10 (last
visited Nov. 7, 2005) (noting that a HRW report documenting police brutality in Papua New
Guinea prompted the country's police minister to publicly acknowledge those findings and to
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Finally, the media may identify as decision-makers actors that,
before media attention, were wholly outside the international legal
process. The Falun Gong, for example, was practically unheard of in
the West until, in the face of Beijing’s crackdown in the late 1990s,35 it
actively solicited coverage and sympathy from the Western media.36
The strategy was successful. A few weeks after the surge of attention
by the Western media, the European Union publicly disapproved of
Beijing’s crackdown on “dissenters”—naming the Falun Gong, in particular37 —and the U.S. State Department’s annual report on human
rights referenced Beijing’s actions against the Falun Gong as evidence
of China’s poor human rights conditions.38 Media attention thus increased the likelihood and intensity of the international response in
favor of the Falun Gong. Once the media propelled the Falun Gong
into the public sphere, conventional international actors considered
the group in subsequent policy decisions, such that even the act of
“not dealing” would be an act of considering but rejecting.
In sum, media coverage identifies actors as le gitimate decisionmakers in the international legal process. The media tend to identify
those who already occupy positions of authority in the eyes of the
prescriptive audience, but they sometimes also introduce the audience to new actors. In either event, the actor identified by the media
may come to participate (directly or indirectly) in the decisionmaking process.
2. Dispersing Intelligence. With respect to establishing the parameters of the prescriptive process, the media are perhaps most inexpress his intention to cure the problems); Uzbekistan: HRW Blocks Refugee Return,
http://www.hrw.org/update/2005/09 (last visited Nov. 7, 2005) (noting that HRW's activities contributed to the United Nations airlift of 439 Uzbek refugees to safety). The Amnesty International website also lists its "achievements." See http://www.web.amnesty.org/pages/aboutaigoodnews-eng?open=&target=goodnews&source=homepage_banner (last visited Nov. 7, 2005).
35. See Erik Eckholm, China Sentences 4 in Spiritual Group to Long Jail Time, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 27, 1999, at A1.
36. See Mark Landler, Spiritual Group Meets in Hong Kong, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1999, at
A12; Erik Eckholm, China Sect Members Covertly Meet Press and Ask World's Help, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 29, 1999, at A10.
37. World Briefing: China: Pressed by Europe on Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1999, at
A16.
38. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
1999 COUNTRY R EPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: CHINA (Feb. 23, 2000), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/284.htm. According to officials in the Clinton Administration, Beijing's treatment of the Falun Gong provided the driving force behind the report's
sharp language. See Jane Perlez, U.S. Report Harshly Criticizes China for Deterioration of Human Rights; Russia Also Faulted, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2000, at A8.
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fluential in their function of dispersing intelligence because, in performing this function, the media shape the knowledge that serves as
the input for future decision-making. The media do not simply communicate raw information, but rather gather, process and organize
such information into meaningful intelligence that their audiences can
digest. Because the dispersal of intelligence involves these human
acts of filtering, all intelligence transmitted through the media is, in a
sense, “constructed.” The media, in other words, define and give
shape to the global reality.
In addition to defining “reality” for the media audience, and
therefore shaping the knowledge and input for future decisionmaking, the media -constructed intelligence influences the international legal process at a deeper level of the subconscious—by influencing expectations about policy content, authority, and control.
Those expectations then play out in the prescriptive process. I discuss
this second aspect in greater detail below.
Most of the intelligence dispersed by the news media implicates
conventional international actors and thus reinforces expectations
concerning those actors’ positions in the international legal process.
The news media constantly cover contemporaneous issues on the
agendas of local or State officials, and of major international organizations. Yet, even where the media do not directly cover those agendas, conventional international actors are frequently implicated by
the intelligence that the media disperse because those actors define
the political order that gives the intelligence social meaning.
For example, when the news media covered the tsunami of December 2004, they did not simply report the occurrence and effects of
the tsunami. Rather, they placed the incident in the context of the
broader international order: they reported on the countries hardest
hit,39 on the nationalities of the victims not from the region,40 and on
efforts to provide assistance by various unaffected actors, including

39. See, e.g., Scott Shane, Powell, Praising Relief Effort, Views Sri Lanka Devastation, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 8, 2005, at A9 (noting then-current death tolls in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand and
India); Robert D. McFadden, Relief Delivery Lags as Deaths Pass 140,000, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1,
2005, at A1 ("After Indonesia, Sri Lanka was the country next hardest hit.").
40. See, e.g., Alan Cowell, From Image of Disaster to a Safe Homecoming , N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
3, 2005, at A10 ("Swedish officials say their nation is the hardest hit among Scandinavian countries . . . ."); John Lancaster, Toll from Tsunami Rises Above 25,000; Threat of Hunger, Disease
Looms As Reeling Nations Appeal for Aid, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2004, at A1 ("In Sri Lanka, at
least 72 foreign tourists, including two Americans, died in the disaster.").
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major States and humanitarian organizations.41 By assigning meaning
to the tsunami in terms of the already constructed social and political
order, the mediated intelligence reinforced the audience’s expectations concerning how international actors should respond and who
among the potential actors could act most quickly or capably. Thus,
President Bush was criticized for responding slowly and with an insufficient contribution on behalf of the United States; in response, the
President significantly increased his monetary pledge to a level more
consistent with the public’s perceptions of the role and capacity of the
United States in responding to the consequences of natural disasters.42 The news reports of the tsunami perhaps also contributed to
the perception, at least among audiences in the developed world, of
disorder and a lack of preparedness in the developing countries that
were hardest hit.43 These expectations and perceptions are based on
already existing social constructs, but the media-constructed intelligence also helps reinforce or shape those constructs in ways that play
out in the lawmaking process.
The media, then, have incredible power to define reality and
shape public expectations through the intelligence that they disperse.
What’s more, the media are uniquely situated to perform this function because they are often presumed to be detached transmitters of
information and have the technologies for mass communication and
the expertise to quickly gather and process information. At least in
open societies, these factors contribute to the public trust that the
news media serve as the “watchdog” on the government, and that
they expose intelligence, even if government officials would rather
keep it out of the public sphere.44

41. See, e.g., Wayne Arnold, In Areas All but Unreachable, Helicopter Crews Bring Help,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2005, at A10 (describing U.S. relief effort s); Scott Shane, Pledges Grow,
Hurdles Loom in Relief Effort, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2005, at A1 (discussing aid from the U.S.,
German, and Japanese Governments, as well as from the United Nations and Doctors Without
Borders).
42. See Michael Getler, Aftershocks from Asia , WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2005, at B6; David E.
Sanger & Warren Hoge, U.S. Vows Big Rise in Aid for Victims of Asian Disaster, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 1, 2005, at A1.
43. See HERBERT J. GANS, DECIDING WHAT'S N EWS: A STUDY OF CBS EVENING N EWS,
NBC NIGHTLY N EWS, N EWSWEEK AND TIME 53 (1979) (noting that natural disasters in developing countries may lead to stories that focus on the social or moral disorder that surround the
circumstances of the disaster).
44. Much has been written about the media as a "fourth estate" that serves as a "watchdog" on the government and that checks the integrity of democratic processes. See, e.g., BARAN
& DAVIS, supra note 3; Christina S. Drale, Communication Media in a Democratic Society , 9
COMM. L. POL'Y 213, 224 (2004).
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3. Specifying Substantive Policies. The lawmaking process requires the specification of substantive policies that, with time, transform into law. The media help specify these policies both by serving
as messengers for more conventional actors and by developing substantive policies themselves.
Most frequently, the media help specify substantive policies by
communicating the policy positions of other international actors.45
Conventional actors frequently use the media for this purpose. They
issue official statements, they hold press conferences,46 they give
speeches, and they conduct interviews with an eye toward attracting
media attention and communicating the substance of their message to
the broader public.47 Because in communicating these messages the
media make clear that the messages belong to the conventional actor,
and not to the editor or producer of the particular medium, the communication maintains its signal of authority. And, to the extent that
such communication is reinforced over time, the underlying substantive policy eventually transforms into law.48
Less conventional actors also use the media to communicate to
broad audiences their substantive policy positions. Osama Bin
Laden, for example, has quite successfully used the international media to broadcast his anti-American positions.49 Similarly, once the
media identified the Falun Gong as an international decision-maker,
that group successfully employed the media to spread its message.50

45. See James Carey, Journalists Just Leave: The Ethics of an Anomalous Profession, THE
MEDIA AND MORALITY 39, 51, 53 (Robert M. Baird, William E. Loges, & Stuart E. Rosenbaum
eds., 1999) (describing the media as "middlemen" between the State and the public).
46. Press conferences pretend to exist for the benefit of the physically present audience,
which may consist of journalists, other leaders, or a sample of the population, but such conferences in fact target the mass audience (or particular actors within the mass audience) of the media. See GANS, supra note 45, at 123. Moreover, press conferences purposefully create an image for the audience that consists of more tha n the speaker's words. The speaker's dress,
audience, backdrop, and companions on the podium all target a particular conception of policy.
The press conference thus communicates a policy perspective based on the totality of constructed images. Telephone Interview with Josh Gottheimer, Domestic Speechwriter for President Clinton, in New Haven, Conn. (Feb. 14, 2000).
47. See HENRY KISSINGER, WHITE HOUSE Y EARS 21 (1979) ("Much as the journalist may
resent it, he performs a partly government function. . . . Officials seek him out to bring their pet
projects to general attention, to settle scores, or to reverse a decision that went against them.").
48. See Reisman, International Lawmaking , supra note 2.
49. See, e.g., Alexander Stille, Cameras Shoot Where Uzis Can't, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20,
2003, at B9; Edward Wong, G.I.'s Kill Scores of Militia Forces in 3 Iraqi Cities, N.Y. TIMES, May
8, 2004, at A1; Philip Shenon, Threats and Responses: Wartime Economy; U.S. Tries to Ease Jitters on Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2003, at A1.
50. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
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Although the media usually communicate the substantive policies of other actors, they sometimes specify substantive policies the mselves. The media do this in all sorts of ways, but different types of
media tend to employ different techniques. The traditional news media, for example, tend to communicate policy judgments through their
decisions on cover selection, font size, and the amount of time or
print allocated to a news story.51 Thus, when these media believe that
a news story is important, they print it on the front page and above
the fold, or they broadcast it as “headline” news. These decisions as
to format contribute to the formulation of communal policy because
front-page or headline stories are more likely to attract public attention and to elicit comments from conventional actors. By contrast,
media that are not constrained by the desire to appear “objective”—
and this would include editorial pages and internet weblogs –— may
communicate policy choices directly to the audience. Other media,
such as movies and television dramas, may specify policy preferences
by endorsing or condemning particular social or political norms, usually in a fictional context. The U.S. movie media, for example, tend
to endorse American sentiments against terrorism, drug smuggling
and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.52
In sum, the media participate in the lawmaking process by specifying substantive policies that, with time, transform into law. The
media usually specify the policies of other international actors, such
as those of state officials conveyed through public statements or press
conferences. In addition, the media themselves sometimes specify
policies, by indicating which stories are important or by explicitly endorsing particular policies.
4. Allocating Values. Finally, the media help establish the parameters of the prescriptive process by allocating among different actors certain systemic values, such as power, enlightenment, and communal loyalty.53 The media usually allocate these values concurrently

51. GANS, supra note 45, at 111 (describing the process by which magazines and television
news shows select and prepare their cover or lead stories).
52. See, e.g., THE SIEGE (Twentieth Century Fox 1998) (terrorism); AIR FORCE ONE (Columbia/Tristar Studios 1997) (terrorism); CRIMSON TIDE (Disney Studios 1995) (nonproliferation of nuclear weapons); CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER (Paramount Pictures 1994)
(drug smuggling); PATRIOT GAMES (Paramount Pictures 1992) (terrorism); THE HUNT FOR
R ED OCTOBER (Paramount Pictures 1990) (non-proliferation of nuclear weapons).
53. The New Haven School identifies a number of values as being at stake in the international legal process, including power, enlightenment, health, skill, well-being, affection, respect,
and rectitude. See Reisman, View from New Haven, supra note 2, at 122.
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with performing their other prescriptive functions. Thus, when the
media identify a decision-maker, that actor’s power to influence the
legal process may increase accordingly. Similarly, when the media
disperse intelligence, they contribute to the enlightenment of the audience, including the elite members of the audience who may be decision-makers themselves. Moreover, the nature and focus of the intelligence may help shape the audience’s loyalties to the different myth
systems and ideas that comprise individual or group identities.54
The media are particularly influential in the allocation of communal loyalties. Monroe Price discusses this dynamic in terms of a
“market for loyalties”:
The sellers in this market are all those for whom myths and dreams
and history can somehow be converted into power and wealth—
classically states, governments, interest groups, and others. The
“buyers” are the citizens, subjects, nationals, consumers—recipients
of the packages of information, propaganda, advertisements,
drama, and news propounded by the media. The consumer “pays”
for one set of identities or another in several ways that, together,
we call “loyalty” or “citizenship.” Payment, however, is not expressed in the ordinary coin of the realm: It includes not only compliance with tax obligations, but also obedience to laws, readiness
to fight in the armed services, or even continued residence within
the country. The buyer also pays with his or her own sense of identity.55

The market for loyalties that Professor Price describes takes place
with respect to the establishment of national loyalties, as well as of
loyalties across or within national boundaries.56 In the United States,
identities are established, for example, among those who regularly listen, read, or watch a particular medium, such as the Weekly Standard
or The Rush Limbaugh Show. Similarly, foreign language media allow immigrant communities in the United States to continue to connect and identify with their countries of origin.
Because the media are so powerful in establishing communal
loyalties, international actors have an incentive to manipulate the
54. See Monroe Price, The Market for Loyalties: The Electronic Media and Global Competition for Allegiances, 104 YALE L.J. 667, 678-79 (1994); Horace Newcomb & Paul M. Hirsch,
Television as a Cultural Forum, in TELEVISION: THE CRITICAL VIEW 561, 562 (Horace Newcomb ed., 2000) (noting that the ritual model of communication views media communications as
being directed toward "the maintenance of society in time"). Cf. BENEDICT ANDERSON,
IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (1991) (explaining the press as a means through which imagined national communities develop).
55. Price, supra note 54, at 669-70.
56. See id.; W. PHILLIPS DAVISON, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 62
(1965).
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media for this purpose.57 International actors regularly use the media
to influence the loyalties of audiences either in their own countries or
transnationally.58 During the Cold War, the United States and the
Soviet Union each spent millions broadcasting in developing countries the news of world events through the capitalist or communist
(respectively) lens.59 Similarly, after September 11, 2001, the U.S.
Government worked to “sell” its image to audiences in the Middle
East. The Bush Administration appointed a former advertising executive, Charlotte Beers, as Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, and high-level Administration officials started appearing on
Arabic-language television networks to portray a positive image of
the United States to the audiences of those media.60
In short, in their function of allocating communal values, the media help determine the resources that each actor will have in the decision-making process. The dispersal of intelligence, in particular, contributes to the audience’s enlightenment, and the nature and focus of
such intelligence help shape communal loyalties.
B. Codification
Codification is the reduction of rules to an authoritative code to
govern future interactions. In international law, a codified rule sometimes presents itself in the form of a written code, yet more often the
rule remains unwritten (until applied) but with broad consensus as to
its content. In these instances, the international legal rule is “codified” when there is broad consensus that State practice has developed
into binding custom. 61 The media play a role in building that consensus because of the way in which their communications reflect and reinforce already-existent communal norms.62
57. See Price, supra note 54, at 672-79.
58. See infra notes 102-108 and accompanying text (discussing propaganda in greater detail).
59. See DAVISON, supra note 57, at 195; ENRIQUE GONZALEZ-MANET, THE HIDDEN WAR
OF INFORMATION 69-76 (Laurien Alexandre trans., 1988). Initiated during the Cold War's incipient stages, the Voice of America was reinvigorated in the mid-1980s, such that its annual
budget surpassed $116 million in 1983. Id.
60. See Elizabeth Becker, In the War on Terrorism, a Battle to Shape Opinion, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 11, 2001, at A1.
61. For a discussion of the various ways in which international law is "codified," see Sha btai Rosenne, Codification of International Law, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 632 (1992).
62. See KATHRYN C. MONTGOMERY, TARGET: PRIME TIME 6 (1989) (noting that the media reflect and shape the dominant values and norms in society); Diane M. Glass, Portia in
Primetime: Women Lawyers, Television, and L.A. Law, 2 Y ALE J. L. & FEMINISM 371, 411
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The media are products of their own social and political env ironments, and those environments shape the manner in which media
actors (e.g., journalists, editors, and producers) define the world. For
example, as discussed above, the U.S. movie media tend to reflect and
reinforce—that is, help codify—international legal norms against terrorism, smuggling, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 63
Because the media are products of their own social and political
environments, media from different parts of the world may codify the
same legal norms in different ways, or may codify different legal
norms altogether. For instance, Al Jazeera and other transnational,
Arabic-language media have received significant attention for their
reports involving the United States and Israel.64 As Fouad Ajami explained, Al Jazeera communicates a pan-Arabic perspective, the
“dark side” of which “is an aggressive mix of anti-Americanism and
anti-Zionism.”65 The Arabic -language media do not create these
norms against the United States and Israel so much as they help solidify and even justify them. The norms themselves are deeply embedded in the audience’s social fabrics, and therefore in the social fabrics
of the Arabic-language media.66 These media thus “confirm”,” for
example, that American and Israeli actions in the region equate with
terrorism, and that acts of aggression in response may be appropriate.67 The norms against the United States and Israel then play out in
(1990) (noting that the media, and particularly the television media, reinforce or extend colle ctively -perceived norms). See also supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text (referencing in the
context of the December 2004 tsunami the media's ability to reinforce communal norms).
63. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., Douglas Jehl, Newspapers and TV Paint U.S. Action as Kind of Terrorism,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2001, at B5 (describing the Arabic language media's negative depictions of
the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan); Fouad Ajami, What the Muslim World is Watching , N.Y.
TIMES MAG. 48 (Nov. 18, 2001); Joel Campagna, Between Two Worlds: Qatar's Al-Jazeera Satellite
Channel
Faces
Conflicting
Expectations,
available
at
http://www.cpj.org/Briefings/2001/aljazeera_oct01/aljazeera_oct01.html (last visited on Nov. 2,
2005) (reporting an Al Jazeera source's claim that "some people would put [on the air] what
could be called inflammatory rhetoric or people with outrageous views").
65. See Ajami, supra note 64, at 50.
66. See Campagna, supra note 64 (reporting on an Al Jazeera source's explanation that any
bias at that network "did not stem from ill intent, but rather reflected the reporters' own backgrounds and points of view"); CONTROL R OOM (Magnolia Pictures 2004) (documenting Al
Jazeera's broadcasts of the Iraq War as reflecting the reporters' and producer's' own social and
political understandings, despite their efforts to be "objective").
67. See, e.g., Reviewing the Arab Press, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Sept. 1, 2004 (quoting an editorial in a United Arab Emirates newspaper as stating that recent suicide attacks in Israel were
a "simple response to the Zionist terrorism"); Hamas Leader Says Tel Aviv Blast Response to
Israeli Terrorism, BBC MONITORING INT'L R EP., Sept. 9, 2003 (quoting a Hamas leader as as-
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the international legal process, even if they are not accepted as formal
law.68
In sum, the media play a critical role in solidifying norms and
understandings that already exist in the audience’s social fabrics. In
some instances, the codified norms may be recognized transnationally, but, because the media are products of their own social and political environments, media from different environments may codify
the same norms in different ways or may codify different norms altogether. In the latter instance, the codified norms play a role in the international legal process even if they are not accepted formally as international law.
C. Invocation
Invocation is the provisional characterization of an act as inconsistent with established law.69 The media help invoke the law prima rily by disseminating intelligence of incidents that breach communal
understandings of justice. When the Western media disseminate intelligence of human rights abuses, for example, they invoke (implicitly or explicitly) the international legal prohibitions against such
abuses.70 This invocation is often accompanied by demands for a
serting, on Al Jazeera television during an interview, that a recent suicide attack in Israel came
"within the framework of the response to the Zionist terrorism which is being practised against
the Palestinian people with US and European support"); Selection List: Iraqi Press 10 Dec. 02,
WORLD N EWS CONNECTION, Dec. 10, 2002 (quoting an editorial in an Iraqi newspaper as stating that the "real terrorism" is the "U.S.-Zionist terrorism").
68. For a further discussion on the ways in which norms may constitute a "legal system,"
even if they are not recognized as formal law, see, for example, W. MICHAEL R EISMAN, LAW IN
BRIEF ENCOUNTERS (1999). Professor Reisman explains:
What must exist in order for us to speak of a legal system is not a formal enforcer but
an expectation accompanying a belief that there is a "right" way to act, that someone,
possibly even the injured party, may properly respond, in ways that might otherwise be
improper, to infractions of that expectation. It is this factor that helps sustain the
norm. The durability of norms through time is what makes law, including microlaw,
significant in our lives.
Id. at 13.
69. See Reisman, View from New Haven, supra note 2, at 123.
70. See, e.g., Ethan Wilensky -Lanford, World Briefing Asia: Kyrgyzstan to Expel More Uzbeks, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2005, at A10 (reporting that Kyrgyzstan would return to Uzbekistan
survivors of a recent Uzbek Government crackdown, and quoting a Human Rights Watch researcher as saying that "'[i]t is a violation of international law to return a person to a country
that uses torture, and we know that Uzbekistan is such a country'"); David Rieff, The Precarious Triumph of Human Rights, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 9, 1999, at 36, 39 (quoting the Adv ocacy Director for Physicians for Human Rights as saying that "'[t]he only thing we really know
how to do well is expose'"); Carroll Bogert, Human Rights Watch Communications Director,
Remarks at the Yale Law School Symposium on Human Rights and the Media: Media Responsibility and the Coverage of Human Rights (Apr. 1, 2000).
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remedying response, but such demands are not always met.71 The
process of invoking the law, however, is separate from the process of
upholding or enforcing it. Thus, even if the dissemination of intelligence does not engender a response, the invocation remains.72
D. Application
Application involves using the law to analyze a particular incident or set of facts.73 The media help apply international law prima rily by communicating the analyses of other international actors. For
example, in advance of the July 1, 2004 transition to Iraqi sovereignty,
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz appeared on PBS’s
NewsHour to explain application of the law governing that process.74
Similarly, after President Bush appeared before the U.N. General Assembly in September 2004 to defend his decision to enter Iraq, two
former U.S. Government officials appeared on the NewsHour to discuss the legal norms applicable to that war.75
Although when the media apply the law it is usually by communicating the analyses of other actors, the media sometimes attempt to
apply the law themselves. In some cases, the media may cultivate
journalists who purport to have the expertise to apply international
legal norms to particular fact patterns.76 In other cases, the media,

71. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE WARRIOR'S HONOR: ETHNIC WAR AND THE MODERN
CONSCIENCE 97 (1998) ("There is nothing in the pictures of atrocity or suffering that automatically engenders compassion or involvement. Some pictures, some places engage us; others do
not."); Rieff, supra note 70, at 39 (warning of the dangers of "compassion fatigue," and stating
that "[y]ou can no longer build a political consensus for action, assuming you ever could, by
showing yet another clip of disa ster pornography on television").
72. Especially in the human rights context, the unpredictability of the international response to an invocation by the media creates a double bind. On the one hand, by disseminating
intelligence of violative behavior, the media increase the likelihood of an international response;
public awareness of the incident may pressure international actors to demonstrate support (even
if only verbal) for the violated rule and to call upon the responsible actors to cease their violation. On the other hand, if the media's invocation fails to elicit an international response, that
failure may suggest that the norm is not so binding or widespread as to govern would-be violators, and the over-invocation may thus contribute to the erosion of the law's authority.
73. Reisman, View from New Haven, supra note 2, at 123.
74. NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, Newsmaker: Paul Wolfowitz, (PBS television broa dcast,
May
28,
2004),
available
at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/white_house/janjune04/wolfowitz_05-28.html.
75. NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, Global Agenda, (PBS television broadcast, September 21,
2004), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/july-dec04/global_9-21.html.
76. For example, Christiane Amanpour of CNN and Fareed Zakaria of Newsweek have
earned reputations for international legal analysis. In this sense, Amanpour and Zakaria may
be distinguished from, for example, Linda Greenhouse of the New York Times because Ama n-
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and particularly the movie media, may apply current legal norms to
historical or fictional fact patterns. A number of movies, for example,
have implicitly considered accounts of the Holocaust or other ethnic
wars under the lens of the law prohibiting genocide.77
In any event, the application process communicated through the
media is intended for a mass audience and not for serious international lawyers. Thus, the analysis of applicable legal rules through or
by the media tends not to address the intricacies of the issues, and
tends to be simplified or incomplete.
E. Termination
A norm constitutes law only so long as it reflects communal expectations regarding authority, content and control. Where those expectations change—where, in other words, the relevant community
no longer attaches a source of authority and control to the policy content of the norm—the norm will cease to exist as binding law, and that
cessation will be reflected in the behavior of international actors. The
termination process thus requires the dissolution of a set of expectations surrounding a particular legal principle. The media function in
this process much in the same way that they function in the prescriptive one,78 as the dissolution of one set of expectations necessarily requires the constitution of another.
III. THE MEDIA AND IMPERFECT ACTORS
In Part II of this Article, I analyzed the positive functions that
the media perform in the international legal process. To varying extents, the media participate in the prescription, codification, application, invocation, and termination of international law. Moreover,
media participation has essentially become indispensable. The media
fill the communicative gaps of the international system, and because
of their unique expertise and relationships with the audience, they
participate in the international legal process in ways that other actors
do not and cannot.
Yet the media do not perform their functions perfectly. Rather,
media performance is impeded by a variety of institutional, cultural,

pour and Zakaria may themselves apply the law, whereas Greenhouse communicates the law as
applied by a more conventional actor—the U.S. Supreme Court.
77. See, e.g., HOTEL R WANDA (United Artists 2004); LIFE IS BEAUTIFUL (Miramax Entertainment 1998); SCHINDLER'S LIST (Universal Studios 1993).
78. See supra notes 27-60 and accompanying text.
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and practical factors. In this Part, I consider some of the most prevalent factors that impede the media’s performance in the international
legal process: controls on mediated messages, phenomenological biases among media actors, the institutionalized methods of news production, and the potential for media “capture” to disseminate propaganda. Each of these factors may bias or distort legally relevant
communications and thereby corrupt the international legal process.
A. Controls on Mediated Messages
The media are often impeded from performing their functions as
a result of externally or internally imposed controls on media communications. All States impose some controls on the media operating
within their territory. Some States impose only limited controls, for
example, with respect to the dissemination of licenses or the regulation of broadcasts involving pornography or violence.79 Yet States
that exercise considerable or total control over their media have
available to them a variety of techniques for control, including intimidation,80 censorship,81 and the development of technological barriers
to media transmissions.82 These techniques impede the media from
disseminating to their audiences messages that the State may find offensive, and they thus bias the media reality in favor of the Statepreferred perspective.
In addition to these techniques, which generally affect the media’s ability to transmit intelligence that they already have, States
sometimes also impede the media from accessing that intelligence in

79. See MONROE E. PRICE, MEDIA AND SOVEREIGNTY: THE GLOBAL INFORMATION
R EVOLUTION AND ITS CHALLENGE TO STATE POWER 18, 91 (2002).
80. See, e.g., ARTICLE 19, N O COMMENT: CENSORSHIP, SECRECY AND THE IRISH
TROUBLES 39 (1989) (noting that many journalists reporting on Northern Ireland "experienced
violence or threats in the course of their duties"); Sam Dillon, Zedillo Lectures the Mexicans:
Obey the Law, N.Y.TIMES, Oct. 1, 1996, at A3 (discussing "the kidnapping of a journalist . . . by
what appeared to be plainclothes Government security agents" in Mexico).
81. See, e.g., ARTICLE 19, supra note 80, at 23-25 (discussing, for example, a 1988 United
Kingdom ban on any discussion of five Republican paramilitary groups banned under antiterrorist legislation); Joseph Kahn, Let Freedom Ring? Not So Fast. China's Still China, N.Y.
TIMES, May 3, 2004, at A3 (discussing "China's still all-powerful censors and standard-setters");
Celia W. Dugger, Joining Sri Lanka's Sword: Might of Censor's Pen, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2000,
at A3 ("[Sri Lanka's chief censor's] job is to purge criticism of the government's faltering war on
separatist rebels from newspapers, radio and television."); Howard Schneider, In a Spin Over
the Web; Cautious Arab States Confront Cha llenges of Unleashing Internet, WASH. POST, July 26,
1999, at A13 (discussing internet censorship in the Muslim world).
82. See PRICE, supra note 79, at 17-18 ("[N]ew technologies can enhance as well as diminish [a State's] forms of control."); id. at 202 (discussing radio-jamming).
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the first place. State actors regularly engage in “information management,” or “spin,” to control the intelligence available to the media.83 This technique is particularly effective where the underlying intelligence is available exclusively to State actors, as may be the case
(to varying degrees) with respect to issues of foreign policy, national
security and international armed conflict.84 During the first Gulf War,
for example, the Pentagon quite successfully managed the information that the media disseminated by restricting media access to military combat zones and recreating the Washington experience for reporters in Dhahran and Riyadh, with press briefings and pool
reports.85 In this way, the Administration was able to control the media’s access to newsworthy information about the war. As David Altheide explains: “[T]he war was covered, usually on the ‘sources’
terms because they supplied the visually dominating reports on which

83. See GANS, supra note 43, at 117 (explaining that as journalists try to extract information
from their sources, the sources try to control the journalists' knowledge base).
84. The relationship between the U.S. Government and the media during periods of armed
conflict has evolved over time. During World War II, President Roosevelt saw both the information and the entertainment media as essential to the war effort, and U.S. officials were quite
open with members of the press. See Becker, supra note 60, at B4. The intimacy between the
Government and the press was feasible then because of an understanding that the press would
not print information that could impede the U.S. military efforts. But, with the decline of the
monopoly of the elite press corps over the news, the Government has learned to become more
reserved. The media, first enlisted to promote the war effort in Vietnam, eventually grew critical of tha t war and began releasing gruesome footage that sensitized the American public to the
devastation of war. See CARPENTER, supra note 33, at 166; Becker, supra note 60, at B5. Indeed, because many in the Government viewed the media as partially responsible for the loss of
public support in Vietnam, the Government released almost no information about the subsequent U.S. invasion in Granada. See CARPENTER, supra note 33, at 165-66. The information
disseminated during the first Gulf War was carefully managed, see infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text, and, in the second Gulf War, the Government embedded journalists into military
units so that reporting could be conducted from U.S. front lines. See David D. Kirkpatrick,
News Industry Plans for War and Worries about Lost Ads, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2003, at C1
("[M]ilitary officials have indicated a greater willingness than in Afghanistan or the previous
Gulf War to let journalists cover the front, making preliminary arrangements for some reporters
to travel 'embedded with troops.'"). For a discussion on media reporting during modern wars,
see MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, VIRTUAL WAR: K OSOVO AND BEYOND 191-96 (2000); id. at 196
("Truth is always a casualty in war, but in virtual war, the media creates the illusion that what
we are seeing is true.").
85. See David L. Altheide, Postjournalism Is Dead, Long Live Journalism! The Gulf War
in Perspective, CONTROLLING BROADCASTING: ACCESS, POLICY AND PRACTICE IN N ORTH
AMERICA AND EUROPE 134-65 (Fulbright Papers vol. 13) (Meryl Aldridge & Nicholas Hewitt
eds., 1994); CHRIS HEDGES, WAR IS A FORCE THAT GIVES US MEANING 23 (2002) ("[During
the Gulf War] the international press willingly administered a restrictive pool system on behalf
of the military under which carefully controlled groups of reporters were guided around the
front lines by officers.").
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TV news formats thrive. News organisations covered the war even
when they knew they were being misled systematically . . . .”86
Apart from the controls imposed by States on the media, the
media sometimes impose controls on themselves, for example, to preserve their relationships with useful sources or to satisfy commercial
interests. Journalists who regularly depend on official sources may, in
the interest of ensuring a future flow of information, choose not to
disseminate intelligence that their sources would rather keep out of
the public sphere.87 In a similar vein, media enterprises may choose
not to disseminate intelligence out of a more general respect for the
host government. When Katherine Graham was President of the
Washington Post, she reportedly assured a group of recruits for the
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency that she believed “democracy flourishes when the government can take legitimate steps to keep its secrets and when the press can decide whether to print what it knows.”88
More recently, U.S. television news broadcasters decided not to air
videotapes delivered by Osama bin Laden after September 11, 2001,
on the basis of the Administration’s characterization of those tapes as
potentially containing sensitive or suspect information.89
In addition, the media may control the structure or substance of
their communications for commercial interests.90 Structurally, the
need to generate advertising revenues may compel a medium to intersperse intelligence that relates to the national and global orders with
“fluff” pieces or advertisements. The networks’ evening news programs, for example, tend to devote thirty seconds to three minutes on
a major international event and then break for two minutes of commercials. This affects the significance that the viewers, consciously or
not, attribute to the event. Substantively, commercial interests may
either encourage the media to avoid topics from which their audience
may feel disengaged or to increase the entertainment content in order
to attract a wider audience.91
86. Altheide, supra note 85, at 141; see also IGNATIEFF, supra note 84, at 196 ("In the Gulf
War . . . movement of journalists was used successfully to control their reporting.").
87. See GANS, supra note 43, at 116-17; CARPENTER, supra note 33, at 5.
88. ALEXANDER COCKBURN & JEFFREY ST. CLAIRE, WHITEOUT: THE CIA, DRUGS AND
THE P RESS 31 (1998).
89. See Bill Carter & Felicity Barringer, The Coverage: Networks Agree to U.S. Request to
Edit Future bin Laden Tapes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2001, at A1.
90. For an argument that the capitalist interests of the mass media have deteriorated the
informational quality of the public sphere, see generally HABERMAS , supra note 3.
91. WAR PHOTOGRAPHER (Christian Frei 2001) (noting that many media shirk away from
images and stories that might depress or distance their audiences); David Gelber, Executive
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In sum, the variety of controls on media communications—
whether externally or internally imposed—impede media perfor mance by resulting in the dissemination of biased or inaccurate information or in the failure to disseminate valuable information. In all
instances, such controls may corrupt the international legal process.
B. Phenomenological Biases
The media are also impeded from performing optimally as a result of the inherent cultural biases that pervade their work. As discussed above, the media are products of their own social and political
environments, and their constructions of reality reflect personal, professional and cultural biases.92 Indeed, it is by reflecting cultural biases that the media function to help codify communal norms, but the
“underbelly” of this function is that the phenomenological biases may
render media communications incomplete or inaccurate. This is evident from the discussion above with respect to the Arabic-language
media, which tend to reinforce the audience’s phenomenological biases against the United States and Israel without necessarily questioning or challenging those biases.93
As a general matter, media communications reflect the phenomenological biases that exist among media actors themselves, in
terms of the value and reality judgments that media actors make
when selecting what to report and how to report it. To the extent that
media actors make those judgments without scrutinizing their phenomenological biases, the media reality will reinforce those biases
among members of the audience, especially among those who lack
any firsthand experience of the issue (which tends to be the case with
respect to international issues).94 As a result, the incomplete and bi-

Producer of CBS News, Remarks at the Yale Law School Symposium on Human Rights and the
Media: Using the Media for Human Rights Advocacy (Mar. 31, 2000) (describing the consumer
surveys that media enterprises undertake to cater to mass preferences).
92. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
94. Audience members generally process media communications through their own experiences, and a viewer with firsthand experience of the subject is more likely to reject messages
that fail to comport with his or her own experiences. See DAVISON, supra note 56, at 28-29;
John Tomlinson, Cultural Globalization and Cultural Imperialism, in INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNICATION AND GLOBALIZATION 170, 181 (Ali Mohammadi ed., 1997) ("[W]e should
not only avoid the rather patronizing attitude towards cultural agents that sees them as passive
terminus of a flow of cultural influence, we should also be able to see that there is in fact never a
simple 'delivery' of cultural influence.").
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ased media reality becomes the operative reality of the viewing audience.
C. Methods of News Production
Media performance is further impeded by certain methods of
news production. In the United States, news production with respect
to global events has, for the most part, become a collective process
such that most information is obtained from a small sampling of
sources. This is often done by way of official statements or press conferences.95 When such information is obtained by other means, it
tends to be processed by one of the four major wire services because
only a few news organizations maintain extensive foreign bureaus.96
As a result of this institutionalized process of news production, ina ccurate or incomplete information gathered or disseminated by the
original source will be repeated by a variety of news media, thereby
incorrectly enforcing its signal of authority.
Moreover, all news media tend to simplify global events into
truncated “news stories” that lose the details and intricacies of the
event97 and that often seek to entertain as much as, if not more than,
they seek to educate or inform.98 This tendency to simplify global
events has, in recent years, been exacerbated by the 24-hour news cycle because the time pressure to deliver news reduces the time for

95. See, e.g., TIMOTHY E. COOK, GOVERNING WITH THE N EWS: THE N EWS MEDIA AS A
POLITICAL INSTITUTION 71 (1998); FRANK WEBSTER, THEORIES OF THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY 79 (1995); GANS, supra note 43, at 116 (explaining that journalists actively pursue only
a handful of regular sources).
96. WEBSTER, supra note 95, at 79 (noting that ninety percent of international news in the
United States comes from one of the four major news agencies—United Press International,
Associated Press, Reuters, and Agence France Presse).
97. See GANS, supra note 43, at 162; EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN, N EWS FROM N OWHERE 4
(1973) (quoting Reuven Frank, the initiator of NBC's nightly news program, as instructing his
staff about the essence of a news story: "Every news story should, without sacrifice of probity or
responsibility, display the attributes of fiction, of drama"); Michael W. Reisman, A Jurisprudence from the Perspective of the "Political Superior" , 23 N. K Y. L. R EV. 605, 614 (1996)
("Viewers of the mass media in advanced industrial systems perceive selected events presented
as 'cause' and selected events presented as their 'effect' as a relatively straight-forward and unnuanced sequence and in an unusual, if not wholly unreal, physical and temporal proximity.");
Gelber, supra note 91 (contending that the "fictionalization" of news persists in the production
of television news today).
98. See, e.g., Robert C.L. Moffat, Mustering the Moxie to Master the Media Mess: Some Introductory Comments in the Quest for Media Responsibility, 9 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 137,
146 (1998) (discussing the transformation of the news media into entertainment).
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analysis and sourcing.99 The tendency to reconfigure information into
a (more or less entertaining) “story” results, not only in the manipulation of information, but also in the under-dissemination of stagnant
political problems for which there are no “beginnings” or “ends.”
To be sure, there are exceptions to these trends. For example,
newspapers continue to address issues in greater depth and range
than television news programs, and, among television news programs,
PBS’s NewsHour is noticeably more thorough in its content and
sourcing.100 Nevertheless, to the extent that the trends exist, they distort the media reality, and thus the reality as understood by the vie wing public.
D. Propaganda
Finally, and perhaps most notoriously, the media corrupt the international legal process when they are “captured” by propagandists.
The line between propaganda and “spin” is a fuzzy one, but propaganda may be defined as communications intended to influence the
audience’s response with respect to the message or subject of the
communication.101 Propaganda varies significantly in terms of the
manner in which it is produced and in terms of its intensity and effects, but all propaganda presents the risk of biasing legally relevant
communications. Despite these risks, it would be overly simplistic to
assert that all propaganda is necessarily harmful or undesirable. To
the contrary, the use of propaganda may be desirable, for example, to
the extent it can be used to peacefully bring about positive changes in
the world arena.102
That said, propaganda might also be used to produce harmful
outcomes. The paradigmatic case of such harmful propaganda is the
Nazi Party’s use of the radio media —which Hitler referred to as “a
terrible weapon in the hands of those who know how to make use of
99. See PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, THE STATE
N EWS MEDIA 2005, at 5, http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2005/execsum.pdf (last visited
July 23, 2005).
100. PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM, OVERVIEW (CONTENT ANALYSIS), THE
STATE
OF
THE
N EWS
MEDIA
2005,
http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2005/narrative_overview_contentanalysis.asp?cat=2&media=1
(last visited July 21, 2005).
101. I derive this definition from B.S. Murty. See MURTY, supra note 5, at 7; see also
HAROLD LASSWELL, WORLD POLITICS AND PERSONAL INSECURITY (1934) (cited in BARAN &
DAVIS, supra note 3, at 74-75) (defining propaganda in terms of the manipulation of communications to bring about mass actions or beliefs).
102. See MURTY, supra note 5, at 82.
OF THE
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it”—as part of a broader, tightly integrated propaganda machine.103
As the Nazi’s master propagandist, Joseph Goebbels, explained to the
heads of German radio stations:
I believe radio to be the most modern and most important instrument of mass influence . . . . Radio must rally together 100% of the
people. And once we have them, radio must hold this 100%, must
defend them, and must so thoroughly indoctrinate them that none
can break away.104

More recently, the radio and print media were used to exacerbate latent tensions between the Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups in Rwanda
and to contribute to the 1994 genocide in that country.105 The broadcasts of Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) were particularly powerful because television media were essentially nonexistent in Rwanda, and because, with the exception of governmentrun Radio Rwanda, RTLM was the only available radio station in the
region.106 Moreover, because RTLM was next to Radio Rwanda on
the dial, RTLM communications were sometimes broadcast over the
government frequency, thus giving them an air of authority107 In this
environment, the media were a powerful tool with which to manipulate latent prejudices, emotions and belief systems in Rwanda.
IV. MEDIA ENVIRONMENTS
In Part II of this Article, I described the positive functions that
the media (as mass communicators) perform in the international legal
process. Yet, as I discussed in Part III, the media do not perform
those functions perfectly. Rather, they are impeded by a variety of
systemic factors. These include controls on mediated messages, phenomenological biases among media actors, the methods of news pro-

103. JULIAN HALE, RADIO POWER: PROPAGANDA AND INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING
1-9 (1975).
104. Joseph Goebbels, Ansprache an die Intendanten und Direktoren der Rundfunkgesellschaften [Speech to the Directors of the Radio Broadcast Companies] (Mar. 25, 1933), in 1
GOEBBELS-R EDEN, 1932-1939, at 82, 91-92 (Helmut Heiber ed., 1971) (translated by Kevin S.
Blume).
105. See Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR -99-52-T, Judgment (Dec. 3, 2003) (finding
two founders of Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines and the editor-in-chief of the newspaper Kangura guilty of numerous counts of genocide); Gregory S. Gordon, "A War of Media,
Words, Newspapers and Radio Stations": The ICTR Media Trial Verdict and a New Chapter in
the International Law of Hate Speech, 45 V A. J. INT'L L. 139 (2004); Recent Cases: The Media
Case, 117 HARV. L. R EV. 2769 (2004); Dina Temple -Raston, Radio Hate, LEGAL AFF., Sept.Oct. 2002, at 30.
106. See Temple-Raston, supra note 105, at 30.
107. Id.
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duction, and the use of the media for propaganda. To varying degrees, these factors contribute to the dissemination of inaccurate, biased, or manipulated communications, and to the extent these communications are legally relevant, they may also contribute to the
corruption of the international legal process. In light of all this, two
questions arise: in what conditions do the media perform optimally,
and how might those conditions be fostered?
With respect to the first question, it seems clear that, as a general
matter, the media best perform their legal functions when they operate in a liberal media environment—where a variety of media compete for the audience’s attention, and the media are, for the most
part, free from external controls and committed to minimizing internal controls.108 This sort of environment finds support in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides that “[e]veryone
has the right to freedom of opinion and expression,” including the
rights “to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any
media and regardless of frontiers.”109 The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights thus supports a liberal media environment as an end in
itself. Media communications contribute to the audience’s enlightenment, and there is, therefore, inherent value in an environment in
which there is wide access to the shaping and sharing of media messages.
Such an environment is also desirable from the perspective of
minimizing the systemic factors that impede the media in the performance of their international legal functions. Where there is wide
access, in terms of both the communicator and the audience, there is a
decreased likelihood of the media collectively being limited by controls, phenomenological biases, methods of news production, or of
their communicating propaganda with harmful effects. This is not to
say that the media will never be impeded by such factors. The media
environment in the United States is quite liberal, but, as discussed in
Part III, it is not free from such impediments. Rather, although in
liberal environments the media are free to produce poorly sourced or
inaccurate communications, or communications that lack rigor in
analysis, such environments also enable other media to cancel out
such communications—by revealing the biases of such communica-

108. I derive this understanding of the optimal media policy from B.S. Murty. See MURTY,
supra note 5, at 77-78, 287.
109. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 19, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., 1st plen, mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
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tions or maintaining independent commitments to thorough and accurate reporting.
Thus, as a general matter, media operating in liberal environments are unlikely to communicate propaganda with harmful effects
because, in such environments, propagandistic communications are
likely to be offset by other media communications.110 Yet any propaganda that correlates with imminently harmful outcomes should be
controlled. (In these limited cases, the interest against such propaganda outweighs the interest against State-imposed controls on media
communications because of the imminent harmful outcomes of the
propaganda.) There can be no bright-line rule as to when media
communications will correlate with imminently harmful outcomes.111
Particular communications must be considered in context. That is,
they must be considered in light of the intents and capabilities of the
communicator(s), the expectations and responses of the audience,
and whether audience members will be favorably disposed to the
message of the communication.112 In Rwanda, for example, a number
of factors contributed to RTLM’s harmful effects, including the latent
tensions between Tutsi and Hutu groups, the relative lack of alternative media, and the appearance that RTLM operated under the authority of the government.113
Although the international community has indicated support for
liberal media environments in general terms, it has succeeded neither
in establishing such environments nor in setting forth aspirational
standards. Rather, to the extent that the international community has
tried to legislate in this area, it has focused only on transborder communications and has been unable to square the interest in a liberal
media environment with the preservation of State sovereignty over its
internal media space.
The failure to resolve this tension is apparent in a number of international instruments addressing media communications. For instance, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) provides that “[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of
expression,” which includes the right to “impart information and
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in

110.
111.
112.
113.

See MURTY, supra note 5, at 78.
See id.
See id. at 7, 44.
See supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
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print, in the form of art, or through any other media.”114 Yet the
Covenant then subjects that right to any restrictions necessary for
(among other things) the “respect of the rights or reputations of others,” or for the protection of “public health or morals.”115 The
ICCPR thus gives a State quite a bit of leeway to restrict media communications that it finds undesirable.
Similarly, the mass media declaration issued by the United Nations Organization for Education, Science and Culture (UNESCO)
endorsed both the “free flow” of information and the “wider and
more balanced dissemination of information.” 116 The latter standard
was intended to shield developing States from the strong influences of
the Western media,117 and UNESCO’s implication in its declaration
and subsequently that the interest in a “wider and more balanced dissemination of information” might warrant restricting the “free flow”
of information caused significant controversy and ultimately contributed to the U.S. Government’s decision to withdraw from the organization.118 The international community, then, has not succeeded in
resolving the tension between the interest in the free flow of media
communications and the interest in preserving State sovereignty over
internal media space.119
114. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, art. 19(2), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
115. Id. at art. 19(3). Article 19(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights provides in full:
The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it
special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions,
but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:
For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public
health or morals.
116. General Conference of UNESCO, Oct.-Nov. 1968, Declaration on Mass Media , art IX,
UNESCO Doc. 20C/20 Rev. (Nov. 21, 1978).
117. Id.
118. See generally Micha el J. Farley, Comment, Conflicts over Government Control of Information—The United States and UNESCO, 59 TUL. L. R EV. 1071 (1985).
119. Another poignant example of the international community's failure to resolve the tension between the free flow of information and State sovereignty over internal media space is the
(failed) international effort to regulate the use of direct satellite television broadcasting. During
the multilateral discussions on this issue, three basic positions developed. The first position focused on the interest of States to define their own cultural and communication policies without
interference from foreign actors, and argued for a regime in which the host State's consent
would be required for any transnational satellite transmissions. The second position focused on
the interest in the robust freedoms of speech and expression, and argued against State control of
any outgoing or incoming satellite transmissions. The third position sought compromise between the other two, and sought to resolve the tension largely on the basis of bilateral agree-
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To some extent, particular States have resolved this tension
through bilateral or even multilateral negotiations with other States
or with media enterprises. For instance, the European Television
without Frontiers Directive essentially pr ovides for the free flow of
transborder communications, except where one member State hosts
programs that significantly impair the moral development of children
in another member State, in which case the Directive requires bilateral consultations.120 Similarly, information ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council have mediated disputes between Qatar, which
hosts Al Jazeera, and Bahrain arising out of Bahrain’s assertion that
Al Jazeera’s broadcasts violate the public order.121 And China negotiated with Star-TV to give that media enterprise access to the
Chinese market, but, in exchange for such access, Star-TV was
prohibited from carrying the BBC.122
Negotiations between States or between one State and a media
enterprise may result in fewer controls being imposed on media
communications than if the host State acted unilaterally to close its
media space to all foreign media. But these context-specific negotiations do not on their own create liberal media environments and, in
any event, are not comprehe nsive.
In the absence of any such comprehensive regime, liberal media
environments can be fostered through other means. States may work
unilaterally to bring about these conditions. For instance, States may
limit the controls they impose on the content of media communications in their own territories and work to expand media options in
other States, especially those with closed or restrictive media markets.
States have a variety of tools to affect the media markets in other
States. These range from subsidizing or sponsoring media that broadcast into such markets to supporting the development of technologies
that circumvent host State controls, and even to blocking media
communications that directly correlate with violence.123 The appropriate tool in any given situation would, of course, depend on the particular social and political environment of the host State.
To the extent that States, working together or unilaterally, succeed in liberalizing media environments, such liberalization will curments between sending and receiving countries. See CEES J. HAMELINK, THE POLITICS OF
WORLD COMMUNICATION 140-43 (1994).
120. PRICE, supra note 79, at 22.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See id. at 188-89.
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tail but not eliminate the factors that impede the media’s perfor mance of their functions in the international legal process. As noted
above, the factors that impede this performance exist even in liberal
media environments like the one in the United States. In these environments, the media themselves are, for the most part, responsible
for their performance.
Thus, if we are to see changes in the way the media perform their
international legal functions, they must come from the media the mselves. The media, for example, must take steps to overcome phenomenological biases, double-check the accuracy of source material,
provide thorough and comprehensive news coverage, and avoid errors or misstatements. To some extent, news media enterprises in the
West already take such measures,124 not only out of a sense of professional integrity, but also because the vibrant media environment in
the West contains certain checks on the dissemination of misinformation or on the failure to disseminate information. As discussed above,
however, there is significant room for improvement, even among
news media enterprises in the West.
CONCLUSION
The international legal process is characterized by significant
communicative gaps that the media (as mass communicators) help fill.
As I discussed in Part II of this Article, the media perform functions
at every stage of the legal process. With respect to lawmaking, the
media help establish both the parameters of the lawmaking process
and the audience’s expectations concerning the policy content, authority and control of the legal norms. The media also play roles, to
varying degrees, in the codification, application, invocation and termination of international legal norms.
Although the media perform indispensable functions in the international legal process, their performance is sometimes impeded by
one of a number of systemic factors. States may try to reduce the
prevalence of such factors in their own media spaces by sustaining
liberal media environments—where a variety of media compete for
the audience’s attention, and the media are, for the most part, free
from external controls—and may work unilaterally to liberalize the
media spaces of other States.

124. See, e.g., The Society of Professional Journalists Code of Ethics, available at
http://spj.org/ethics_code.asp (last visited November 2, 2005).
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Yet there is only so much that States can do. Ultimately, it is up
to the media themselves to transcend the factors that impair the international legal process and to take responsibility for their legally
relevant communications. At least among the Western news media,
this is not likely to happen in the absence of commercial incentives.
Rather, given their unique expertise and relationships with the audience, the media are likely to continue operating in the international
legal process as they do now—performing important functions but
not performing those functions pe rfectly. In the final analysis, other
actors must recognize both the functions and the limits of the media
in the international legal process. The failure to recognize the media’s functions would constrict our understanding of the international
legal process and thus our ability to achieve desirable community
policies; the failure to recognize the media’s limits would risk implementing policies that are based on misunderstood realities.

